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Abstract  
New York City’s elite public specialized high schools have a long history of offering 
a rigorous college preparatory education to the City’s most academically talented 
students. Though immensely popular and highly selective, their policy of admitting 
students on the basis of a single entrance exam has been heavily criticized. Many 
argue, for example, that the policy inhibits diversity at the schools, which are 
predominately Asian, White, and male. In this paper, we provide a descriptive 
analysis of the “pipeline” from middle school to matriculation at a specialized high 
school, identifying group-level differences in rates of application, admission, and 
enrollment unexplained by measures of prior achievement. These differences serve 
to highlight points of intervention to improve access for under-represented groups. 
We also look at the role of middle schools in the pipeline, examining the 
distribution of offers across middle schools and testing for middle school effects on 
application and admission. Finally, we simulate the effects of alternative admissions 
rules on the composition of students at the specialized high schools.  
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New York City’s specialized high schools have a long history of offering a rigorous, 
college preparatory public education to the City’s most academically talented 
students. Stuyvesant High School, the most well-known, was founded in 1904. 
Over the next 35 years, two more high schools opened that eventually joined 
Stuyvesant as the City’s most selective (The Bronx High School of Science and 
Brooklyn Technical High School). Unlike other high schools in the City, these 
schools—along with five others—admit students based solely on their performance 
on the Specialized High School Admissions Test (SHSAT). In a typical year, about 
25,000 8th graders take the SHSAT (roughly 1 in 6 from private schools), and 5,000 
are offered a specialized high school seat. Admitted students represent only 6 
percent of the 80,000 or more 8th graders who apply to NYC public high schools 
each year. 
While there is weak evidence that already high-achieving students have better 
outcomes having attended an elite high school (Abdulkadiroğlu, Angrist, & Pathak, 
2014; Dobbie & Fryer, 2014), the high demand for entry to these schools has drawn 
intense scrutiny to who attends them. Many have argued, for example, that the 
SHSAT rewards intense test preparation and inhibits diversity at the schools, which 
are predominately Asian (64 percent at the three largest, oldest, and most elite 
schools), White (22 percent) and male (57 percent).1 Others contend that the City 
has not gone far enough to ensure advanced students at all middle schools are 
competitive for admission (ACORN, 1996). In 2012, a coalition of educational and 
civil rights groups filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Education claiming 
that exclusive use of the SHSAT is racially discriminatory (Hewitt et al., 2013).2 
Supporters of the test, on the other hand, point to its objectivity and emphasis on 
higher-order skills. The SHSAT receives especially strong support from immigrant 
families, who often view the specialized high schools as an affordable gateway to 
educational and professional success.  
While the SHSAT is the single deciding factor for admission, less is known about the 
roles application behavior, prior academic preparation, student preferences, and 
middle school context play in shaping admissions to the specialized high schools. In 
this paper, we provide a descriptive analysis of the “pipeline” from middle school to 
matriculation at a specialized high school in NYC, highlighting potential points of 
intervention to improve access for under-represented groups. In doing so, we 
address three major questions:  
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(1) Conditional on prior achievement, are there differences in student propensities 
to apply, be admitted, and to matriculate to the specialized high schools that 
lead to an over- or under-representation of students by gender, race/ethnicity, 
educational need, and/or neighborhood?  
(2) To what extent do applicants and admitted students originate from the same set 
of middle schools? Are there “school effects” on students’ propensity to apply 
and be admitted, conditional on achievement and proximity, which could reflect 
differences in school supports for specialized high school admissions, such as 
course offerings or test preparation? 
(3) How might admissions criteria based on academic performance measures other 
than the SHSAT alter the composition of specialized high schools, if at all? 
Drawing on individual-level data for nine cohorts of 8th graders participating in high 
school admissions between 2004-05 and 2012-13, we address each of the above 
questions. For question (1), we use sequential logit models to identify group-level 
differences in application, admission, and matriculation not explained by prior 
achievement on State tests (the strongest predictor of admission outside the 
SHSAT). Conditional on a flexible function of math and ELA scores, we find girls, 
Black, and Latino applicants are substantially less likely to receive admissions offers 
than their male and White counterparts, while Asian applicants are much more 
likely to receive an offer. These differences are necessarily due to differences in 
SHSAT performance not captured by State test scores and other achievement 
predictors (such as attendance and grades). SHSAT performance, however, is not 
the sole explanation for the gender and race imbalance in the elite high schools. We 
observe that girls are overall less likely than boys to apply to the specialized 
schools—which tend to be math and science oriented—and are less likely to accept 
an offer having received one. Conditional on prior achievement, low-income 
students are also less likely to apply. Asian students, on the other hand, are 
substantially more likely than all other racial and ethnic groups to apply, at every 
level of prior achievement, and are more likely to accept an offer if extended one. 
For question (2), we first construct Lorenz curves for the distribution of applicants 
and admitted students across middle schools. Roughly half of all public school 
students offered a seat in the specialized high schools in 2013 attended one of only 
24 middle schools (4.5 percent of all middle schools in the City); 85 percent 
attended one of 88 schools (16 percent of all middle schools).3 To assess whether 




influences on application and admission, we estimate middle school “effects,” 
defined as school average differences in the likelihood of application or admission, 
conditional on students’ achievement and other characteristics. We find only 
modest effects on application, and little to no effects on admission, suggesting the 
concentration of specialized high school admissions in a small number of middle 
schools is due largely to sorting. 
Finally, for question (3) we simulate alternative admissions rules that use State test 
scores, grades, and attendance as admissions criteria in lieu of the SHSAT. Variants 
of these rules have been proposed by opponents of the single test policy in NYC, or 
are used in other selective high schools in the U.S. (Finn & Hockett, 2012; Hewitt 
et al., 2013). We find that awarding admission based on these alternative criteria 
would have little effect on the average baseline achievement of specialized high 
school students—at least by these measures—but would have large effects on their 
demographics. A much greater fraction of female applicants would receive offers 
than under the current policy, fewer Asian students would be admitted, and a 
modestly higher fraction of White and Latino students would receive offers (though 
Asian and White students would still be significantly over-represented). The 
alternative criteria would do little to reduce the concentration of offers to a 
minority of middle schools, and would not appreciably increase the number of 
offers extended to Black students. Admissions rules that set aside seats for high-
achieving students in every middle school—such as a “Top 10 percent” rule—would 
have a large impact on diversity, but at the cost of reducing the average achievement 
of incoming students. 
In the next section, we provide a brief overview and history of specialized high 
schools in NYC, and describe the admissions process. In section 3 we describe 
mechanisms by which applications and admissions to the specialized schools may in 
theory be associated with or influenced by student characteristics and middle school 
context. Section 4 describes our data sources and empirical methods, while sections 
5-7 present our results. We conclude with a brief discussion of policy implications 
in section 8.  
2. Background: Specialized High Schools in New York City 
There are currently eight specialized high schools in New York City (Table 1) that 
base admissions on the SHSAT. Stuyvesant High School, The Bronx High School of 
Science (“Bronx Science”), and Brooklyn Technical High School (“Brooklyn Tech”) 
are the oldest, largest, and most well-known. (We refer to these later as the “big 
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3”). The remaining five are smaller, and four are relatively new, having opened 
since 2002. A ninth school, the Fiorello H. LaGuardia High School of Music & Art 
and Performing Arts, does not use an admissions test, but instead requires students 
to submit an audition or portfolio.4 
Admission to the specialized schools is based strictly on the SHSAT, which students 
can choose to take in the fall of 8th grade.5 On exam day, applicants submit a ranking 
of their preferred specialized high schools, up to a total of eight. SHSAT scores are 
sorted from highest to lowest and students are assigned, in order, to the highest-
ranked school on their list with seats available (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2014; Dobbie 
& Fryer, 2014; NYC DOE, 2014). Accordingly, cut scores for admission vary by 
school and year depending on the distribution of scores in that year, student 
preferences, and the number of seats. Cut scores are not made public, but there is a 
well-known hierarchy of selectivity, with Stuyvesant requiring the highest SHSAT 
score, followed by Bronx Science and Brooklyn Tech (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2014; 
Feinman, 2008). 
Specialized high school admissions are separate from, but run concurrently with, 
traditional high school choice. In that process, all rising 8th graders provide a list of 
up to 12 high schools they would like to attend, ranked in order of preference. A 
centralized mechanism matches applicants to schools, taking into account 
preferences, space, admissions priorities (such as geography), and schools’ rankings 
of students (for screened and audition schools) (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, & Roth, 
2009; Bloom et al., 2010; Corcoran & Levin, 2011). Students who apply to exam-
based schools and/or LaGuardia High School also participate in the traditional 
choice process. 6  Admissions offers are extended in the spring, at which point 
students offered a seat in one of the test-based specialized high schools (and/or 
LaGuardia) decide whether to accept or reject the offer. A student may reject the 
offer, for example, if they decide their main high school choice match is preferable 
to their specialized school offer, or if they decide to enroll in a private school. 
Detailed data on offers and acceptance rates during our study period are provided in 
section 5 and the appendix. 
The SHSAT is the product of a 1972 State law, the Hecht-Calandra Act, which 
sought to bring greater equity and transparency to admissions.7 Its use, however, has 
been challenged by advocates and debated for years in local media (Hammack, 
2010). For example, two 1990s reports entitled Secret Apartheid and Secret Apartheid 




segregated school system by admitting mostly White and Asian students from a 
small number of the City’s middle schools (ACORN, 1996, 1997). Those reports 
called for greater supports at the middle school level to help poor and minority 
students prepare for the admissions test. More recently, the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund and others filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Education, stating 
the exclusive use of the SHSAT for specialized high school admissions is racially 
discriminatory (Hewitt et al., 2013). Whatever the merits of these arguments, there 
is little question the elite high schools in NYC lack the gender, racial and ethnic 
diversity of the district as a whole. For example, in 2013-14, enrollment at the 
three largest schools was 59 percent male, 86 percent Asian and White, and only 5 
percent Black and 6 percent Latino. By comparison, 9th graders Citywide were 26 
percent Asian and White, 32 percent Black, 41 percent Latino, and 51 percent 
male. At Stuyvesant High School in 2013-14, only 33 of the school’s 3,292 students 
were Black.8 
While a specialized high school admissions offer is highly coveted, there is mixed 
evidence as to whether attending an elite school has measurable educational benefits 
for already high-achieving students. The most rigorous estimates of the return to 
attending an elite high school in NYC are provided by Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2014) 
and Dobbie & Fryer (2014), who used a regression discontinuity design to contrast 
outcomes of students just above and below the cutoff score for admission. At least 
for students on the margin, they found little to no effect of receiving an offer to 
attend an exam school on AP or State test scores, PSAT or SAT participation or 
performance, or college enrollment, graduation, or quality. These findings recall 
Dale & Krueger (2002), who found modest returns to attending an elite college, 
suggesting most of the achievement differences observed between graduates of elite 
and less-selective institutions reflected self-selection.9 We put aside the question of 
whether elite high schools have value-added for already high-achieving students 
beyond their next best alternative, and proceed on the basis that these schools 
provide an educational good that many students in NYC and their families value.   
3. Theory: Factors Affecting Application, Admission, and 
Matriculation to the Specialized High Schools 
Our empirical analysis follows students as they move through the pipeline from 
middle school to enrollment in a specialized high school. As described in section 2, 
this pipeline includes several key milestones: the decision to apply to a specialized 
school (i.e., taking the SHSAT), the awarding of an admissions offer, the decision to 
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accept or reject an offer, and enrollment in 9th grade. We refer to the decision to 
accept an offer of admission as “matriculation.” Although there is some attrition 
between acceptance and enrollment in the fall of 9th grade, nearly all students who 
accept their offer enroll in their offered school. 
Here we briefly describe factors that in theory may affect a student’s movement 
through this pipeline. In a narrow sense, applying to a NYC specialized high school 
is relatively costless; students simply sign up for the SHSAT and give up 2.5 hours 
on a weekend in October for the test. A competitive score will, for most, require 
advance preparation, which can significantly increase the explicit and implicit cost of 
applying. Students who perceive a low likelihood of admission may not find it 
worthwhile to make this investment, though in practice disincentives to apply 
appear low, as almost a third of all rising 8th graders take the SHSAT. Curricular 
appeal may play an important role in the decision to apply, as the three largest 
specialized high schools (Stuyvesant, Brooklyn Tech, and Bronx Science) have a 
traditionally strong math and science curriculum. To the extent girls are more 
resistant, on average, to attending schools with a math and science orientation, they 
may be less likely to apply (e.g., Buser et al., 2014; Legewie & DiPrete, 2014; 
Schneeweis & Zweimüller, 2012). Proximity may also influence application: high-
achieving students may be unwilling to apply to a specialized school if attending 
would require a long commute.10 
Conditional on applying, offers of admission are a deterministic function of SHSAT 
performance. Therefore, observed associations at the offer stage must be 
attributable to differences in SHSAT scores. 11  Math and ELA achievement as 
measured on the State tests are strong predictors of admission, and thus strongly 
associated with SHSAT performance, but the SHSAT may be sensitive to higher-
order skills the State test is not. Group-level differences in admission conditioned 
on test scores may therefore reflect differences in these higher-order skills. The 
scoring of the SHSAT has been claimed by some to advantage students with 
exceptionally high ability in one content area, such as mathematics, over students 
with very high ability in both content areas (Feinman, 2008). If true, this may 
influence group differences in admission (as well as test-taking strategies). Students’ 
own effort to prepare for the SHSAT will influence their likelihood of admission, 





At the acceptance stage, students decide whether to accept or reject their 
specialized school offer or opt for a different (public or private) school. In theory, 
students will have only ranked specialized schools they are interested in attending, 
but in practice may rank all eight of the schools, given there is no cost to doing so 
(they can always turn down an offer). Students applying to specialized schools must 
also participate in traditional high school choice, and upon receiving a specialized 
high school offer may find they prefer their traditional school match. (This is more 
likely when the offer is not from one of the “big 3”). Until 2014, the traditional 
matching process had a provision for students scoring in the top 2 percent of the 7th 
grade ELA distribution, guaranteeing admission to an “educational option” school of 
their choice (non-specialized schools that sometimes have highly-regarded honors 
programs), provided they designate it as their first choice. Students who met this 
criterion were therefore more likely to have an attractive alternative and turn down 
their offer. 
Finally, middle schools can influence the propensity to apply and be admitted 
through any of the above channels. For example, schools vary in resources devoted 
to counseling or preparing students to take the SHSAT. In some middle schools—
such as those with an honors or gifted program—the curriculum may be better 
aligned with the SHSAT than in others. Schools can create a culture of high 
expectations and aspirations to attend the specialized schools, and peer behavior 
may influence students’ likelihood of applying (Lauen, 2007; Langenkamp, 2009).  
Factors like those described in this section influence the composition of students at 
each stage of the specialized high school pipeline, and are plausible explanations for 
differences we observe in section 5. The next section describes the data we employ, 
and our empirical approach. 
4. Data and Empirical Approach 
Our analysis focuses on nine cohorts of 8th graders who participated in high school 
admissions between 2004-05 and 2012-13, about 80,000 students per year. We 
rely primarily on High School Admissions Process (HSAPS) data provided by the 
NYC Department of Education, which reports whether or not a student applied to a 
specialized high school (i.e., took the SHSAT), whether he or she was offered a seat 
(and to which school, through 2010-11)13, and whether or not the offer of admission 
was accepted. This data also includes students’ ranked and matched schools from the 
traditional choice process, their final assignment, and other basic student 
information. Importantly, we do not observe individual SHSAT scores, nor do we 
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observe students’ rankings of the specialized high schools. An offer of admission to 
specialized high school S simply means that a student’s SHSAT score was above the 
minimum cutoff for S, and that this school was the highest-ranked one they qualified 
for that had not already been filled by students with higher scores. 
Using anonymous identifiers, we linked HSAPS data to administrative data on 
students’ background and academic history. This includes 7th and 8th grade scores on 
the New York State tests in math and ELA, race/ethnicity, gender, age, eligibility 
for free or reduced price meals (an indicator of poverty), English language learner 
(ELL) status, country of birth and immigration year, 7th and 8th grade attendance 
rates, days late in 7th grade, 8th grade course grades (2009 only), special education 
status, and geocoded residential address. From administrative data we also have the 
student’s middle school of record (called the “feeder,” since not all apply from 
traditional middle schools), the student’s enrollment status and school in 9th grade 
(if a public school), and descriptive characteristics for their middle and high school 
of record (if public). 
Our baseline sample consists of 728,677 rising 8th graders (shown in Table 2). In 
our initial overview of specialized high school applications, admissions, and 
matriculations, we begin with all students participating in high school admissions 
from both public and non-public feeder schools. However, because test scores and 
background characteristics are unavailable for most private school students, the 
greater part of our analysis focuses on applicants from public schools, who represent 
more than 90 percent of applicants in the baseline sample (N=659,464). 
Given the above data on public school applicants, section 5 shows how the 
composition of applicants and admitted students evolves at each stage of the 
pipeline. These statistics are suggestive of populations who may be over- or under-
represented at each step. However, as they characterize an increasingly high-
achieving population of students, they do not go far toward disentangling group 
differences in application and admission from group differences in achievement. 
Toward that end, we estimate sequential logistic regression models for application, 
admission, and matriculation to a specialized high school. Each model is estimated 
conditional on having reached a given stage. For example, our admissions model 
applies only to students who applied (took the SHSAT), and our model for 
matriculation pertains only to students who received offers to attend a specialized 




(1)  Pr(APit=1) = f(Xit’β + ηt + g(ELAit) + h(mathit)) 
(2)  Pr(OFit=1|APit=1) = f(Xit’γ + ηt + g(ELAit) + h(mathit)) 
(3)  Pr(ACit=1|OFit=1) = f(Xit’δ + ηt + g(ELAit) + h(mathit))    
where APit, OFit, and ACit are binary outcomes equal to 1 if student i applied to a 
specialized high school, was offered admission, and accepted, respectively, and 
equal to zero otherwise. We also estimate a version of (2) for offers to the “big 3” 
schools. The probability of each event is assumed to depend on X, a vector of 
student characteristics (such as gender, race/ethnicity, and borough of residence), a 
cubic function of the student’s ELA and math scores (g and h), which allow for 
nonlinearity in the relationship between achievement on the State test and these 
outcomes, and a cohort effect ηt. In models (1) and (2) we include in X a measure 
of travel time via public transportation from i’s middle school to the nearest “big 3” 
specialized high school. For students offered admission, we estimate a variant of (3) 
that controls for travel time to the offered school. For ease of interpretation, we 
report average marginal effects (AMEs) for the explanatory variables, rather than 
logit coefficients (reported in the appendix). The AME for a variable xk is the 
average of the estimated marginal effect for xk across all students, fixing the values of 
other covariates at their actual values.   
Section 6 examines variability across middle schools in the propensity to apply and 
be admitted to a specialized high school. We first look at the distribution of 
applicants and admitted students across middle schools to assess the extent of 
concentration. We then estimate feeder school effects via linear probability model 
(LPM) versions of our models (1)-(3), with random or fixed school effects. These 
models use the same controls as (1)-(3), but (in the case of random effects models) 
add indicators for the 32 geographic school districts to better capture differences in 
proximity to the specialized high schools.  
Our approach to simulating the effects of alternative admissions criteria is described 
in section 7. 
5. The Pipeline: An Overview of Admissions to NYC’s 
Specialized High Schools 
Table 2 provides an overview of applications and admissions to the City’s specialized 
high schools. Several things are worth noting. First, nearly a third of all 8th graders 
in the baseline sample (31.8 percent) applied to a specialized school during the 2005 
to 2013 period. This amounts to roughly 25,000 per year. Second, of those who 
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apply, approximately 19 percent receive an offer of admission. The largest of the 
specialized high schools—Brooklyn Tech, Stuyvesant, and Bronx Science—together 
accounted for 78 percent of all offers. Third, not all students who receive an offer 
matriculate in that school. Indeed, only 72 percent did so during this period. Rates 
of acceptance vary by school (panel B), ranging from a high of 87 percent 
(Stuyvesant) to a low of 21 percent (Brooklyn Latin). Finally, private school 
students are over-represented among specialized school applicants and offers (14.5 
and 16.3 percent, respectively, compared with 9.5 percent of the baseline sample), 
but are only moderately over-represented among matriculants (11.2 percent). 14 
Although not shown in this table, most students who accept their offer enroll in 
their accepted school in 9th grade, doing so about 96 percent of the time. Taken 
together, exam school students represent a select subset of rising 9th graders. 
During this period, offers were extended to only 6.2 percent of the baseline (or just 
5.7 percent of 8th graders in public schools), and only 4.4 percent of the baseline 
accepted an offer and enrolled in their offered school (about 3,600 students per 
year). 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for public school students at various stages of 
the pipeline. In this table, the first column describes all public school students in the 
baseline; the second describes applicants to specialized high schools; the third and 
fourth describe students receiving offers; and the fifth describes matriculants. The 
fourth column—offers to the “big 3” specialized schools—uses only data through 
2010. 
There are notable, if unsurprising, differences in the composition of students at each 
stage. For example, specialized school applicants scored significantly higher on State 
tests than the baseline—on average, about 0.66 standard deviations (s.d.) in ELA 
and 0.74 s.d. in math. Students receiving a specialized school offer scored higher 
still—about 1.5 s.d. in ELA and 1.7 s.d. in math, on average. Close to 26 percent 
of admitted students scored in the top 2 percent of the ELA exam, which—until a 
recent law change—granted them priority admission to an educational option 
school in the traditional high school matching process. 
Specialized high school applicants as a group tend to be more female than the 
baseline (50.8 percent vs. 49.1 percent), but admissions and acceptances far less so 
(45.6 percent and 42.3 percent, respectively). Compared to the baseline, White 
and Asian students are over-represented among applicants, offers, and admissions. 




29.3 percent of applicants, 54.2 percent of offers, and 60.0 percent of matriculants. 
Blacks and Latinos make up a combined 71.7 percent of the baseline, but only 16.1 
percent of specialized school offers. Queens residents are disproportionately 
represented among applicants, offers, and acceptances, while Bronx residents are 
significantly under-represented. Applicants and admitted students are more 
economically advantaged and have fewer special educational needs than the baseline. 
Still, 32.6 percent of offers went to students eligible for free meals (58.6 percent of 
the baseline was eligible for free meals). As might be expected, only a small share of 
ELL and special education students took the SHSAT, and even fewer were offered a 
seat in a specialized school. 
Table 3 also shows the high concentration of immigrant students in NYC public 
schools, and in particular the specialized high schools. Almost one in five (18 
percent) at each stage of the admissions process were recent immigrants. Among 
the baseline population, the largest immigrant groups were from the Caribbean (5.9 
percent of the student population), Central/South America (4.3 percent), and 
China/Far East Asia (2.3 percent). Caribbean and Latin American immigrants were 
under-represented among applicants and offers, while immigrants from China/Far 
East Asia, South Asia, and Eastern Europe/former Soviet Union represent 
increasingly large shares of applications, offers, and matriculants. For instance, 
Chinese and other Far East Asian immigrants made up 2.3 percent of the baseline, 
but 7.9 percent of matriculants. Remarkably, 28.1 percent of students offered a seat 
in a specialized high school spoke Chinese at home.15 
Figure 1 provides a closer look at the 8th grade math and ELA achievement of 
specialized high school applicants and admitted students in 2013 (both scores are 
normalized to mean zero s.d. one using all 8th grade test takers). Panel A shows the 
percent of students at each score that applied or were admitted to the specialized 
schools, while panel B shows the resulting score distributions for applicants and 
admitted students. Application and admission rates increase non-linearly with math 
and ELA scores, and (notably) not all admitted students had exceptional scores on 
the 8th grade tests, especially in ELA. A non-trivial fraction of high-achieving 
students (15-20 percent of students scoring more than 1 s.d. above average on State 
tests) did not take the SHSAT at all. 
Compositional differences in applicants, admitted students, and matriculants reflect 
an increasingly high-achieving population, and not necessarily group differences in 
the propensity to apply to specialized schools or to be admitted. To identify factors 
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associated with progression through the specialized school pipeline, we estimated 
the sequential logit models described in section 4. The AMEs from these models are 
in Table 4, interpreted as the change in the predicted probability of the outcome for 
the average student given a marginal change in the explanatory variable, holding 
other predictors constant (or in the case of a binary predictor, the change in 
probability associated with being in the specified group rather than the omitted 
category). 
Table 4 shows that ELA and math achievement in 8th grade are both strong 
predictors of application and admission to the specialized schools, though a one-unit 
difference in math performance is associated with a larger change than a one-unit 
difference in ELA performance. Conditional on middle school achievement, we also 
observe interesting differences across groups in the likelihood of application, 
admission, and matriculation to a specialized school. (All of the differences 
described are statistically significant at the 1 percent level or better). For instance, 
Brooklyn residents (the omitted category) were more likely to apply to an exam 
school, relative to residents of the other boroughs, and somewhat more likely to be 
admitted than Queens, Staten Island, and Bronx residents, but less likely than 
Manhattan residents. Upon admission, students in Manhattan and Queens were 
significantly less likely to matriculate than those in other boroughs, by 5-11 
percentage points, perhaps reflecting the quality of their nearby alternatives (public 
and private). 
The gender gap in specialized high school attendance begins at application, and 
grows at the offer and matriculation stages. Conditional on middle school 
achievement, girls were about 3 percentage points less likely to sit for the SHSAT, 7 
points less likely to be admitted having taken the SHSAT (6.1 points for the “big 3”) 
and were a substantial 10.8 percentage points less likely to matriculate when 
admitted. 
With respect to race/ethnicity, we find Black students were more likely to apply to 
the specialized high schools, conditional on their middle school achievement (a 2.9 
percentage point difference), and were more likely to accept an offer if extended 
one (by 8.8 points). However, Black applicants were less likely to be admitted (by 
6.3 points—on a baseline of 19 percent—or 6.0 points for the “big 3”). The 
admissions gap for Latino students was similar, although they were less likely to 
apply than similar White students, by about 3.1 points. Finally, for a given level of 




specialized high schools—by 16.6 percentage points—and were much more likely 
to accept an offer when given one (by 20 points). Among applicants, Asian students 
were more likely to score high enough on the SHSAT for admission than similar 
Whites, by 5-6 percentage points. 
A look at AMEs for other predictors in Table 4 reveals a few other notable patterns. 
Students in charter middle schools were much more likely to apply to the 
specialized high schools (by 6.4 points) but were less likely to be admitted (or 
matriculate) conditional on applying. Conditional on middle school achievement, 
low-income students (those eligible for free meals or who attended a universal free 
meals school) were less likely to take the SHSAT and to be admitted having done so. 
They were, however, more likely to matriculate when given an offer. Student 
behaviors such as attendance and tardiness are associated with application and 
admission in expected directions. Travel distance to the nearest specialized high 
school had a weak but statistically significant negative effect on application, but was 
not a strong deterrent to acceptance among admitted students.16 
Finally, we note that students who scored in the top 2 percent of the 7th grade ELA 
exam—and were therefore eligible for guaranteed admission to their first choice 
educational option program—were indeed less likely to matriculate to a specialized 
high school when given an offer. In Table A-4, we examine the most common 
destinations for the one in four students who did not accept their specialized high 
school offer. Of public school students who turned down an offer during this 
period, 12 percent ended the process with no assignment (suggesting they enrolled 
in a private school or public school outside of NYC), 12 percent accepted an offer at 
LaGuardia High School, and roughly 50 percent opted to attend one of 15 other 
highly-regarded high schools in the City, most prominently Townsend Harris in 
Queens (15 percent), and Beacon (5.8 percent) and Bard (5.6 percent) Early 
College High Schools in Manhattan.17       
In the next section, we take a closer look at the public middle schools from which 
students apply. 
6. Middle Schools and Specialized High School Admissions 
A chief concern of the Secret Apartheid reports of the 1990s (ACORN, 1996, 1997) 
was that students admitted to specialized high schools were disproportionately 
drawn from a small number of the City’s middle schools. For the most part this 
remains true, a reflection of the uneven distribution of high-achieving students 
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across NYC middle schools. For Figure 2, we used our baseline population to 
produce a Lorenz-type curve showing the distribution of applicants and admitted 
students across public feeder schools. The curve plots the cumulative percent of 
students in a group (e.g., applicants) on the y axis that come from a given x percent 
of feeders (on the x axis), after sorting schools in descending order by their number 
of students in that group. If schools were identical in size, a diagonal (45-degree) 
line would indicate a perfectly even distribution of students across schools. Because 
feeder schools vary in size, the baseline Lorenz curve serves as a benchmark for an 
even distribution, rather than the diagonal.18  
The topmost curves in Figure 2 show the distribution of students admitted to 
specialized high schools in 2013. From the top panel we see 53 percent of students 
admitted originated from only 5 percent of the City’s middle schools. 19  By 
comparison, the largest 5 percent of middle schools enrolled about 20 percent of 
the baseline. Eighty-three percent of admitted students originated from only 15 
percent of middle schools, and nearly half of all middle schools sent few if any 
students to the exam schools. The distribution of applicants (those taking the 
SHSAT) is more even: 5 percent of middle schools comprise about 26 percent of 
applicants, and 15 percent of feeders accounted for 53 percent of applications. 
Though not shown here, we looked for changes over time in the concentration of 
applicants and admitted students between 2005 and 2013; the Lorenz curves in 
these years were nearly identical. If anything, the distribution of admitted students 
was more concentrated in 2013 than in earlier years. 
The bottom panel in Figure 2 repeats this analysis for residential zip codes, to see 
whether the concentration observed in the top panel of Figure 1 is a function of 
residential sorting by ability. Here the distribution of applicants and admitted 
students is much less concentrated. This is in part due to the smaller number of zip 
codes than feeders. That said, sorting by academic ability across middle schools 
appears more pervasive in NYC than sorting by ability across residential 
neighborhoods. 
A closer look at the middle schools feeding the specialized high schools reveals a 
large majority of admitted students were already attending highly selective middle 
school programs. Among offers to students in the top 30 sending schools (which 
account for 56 percent of offers), 58 percent attended Citywide or district-based 




percent attended middle schools that screen applicants based on test scores or other 
criteria. Only 12 percent were from unscreened programs (all located in Queens). 
As a more formal test for middle school effects, we estimated LPM versions of the 
logistic models in Table 4 that include (alternately) fixed or random feeder school 
effects. 20  For each model (application, admission, admission to a “big 3,” 
matriculation) we can reject the null hypothesis that school fixed effects are jointly 
zero (p<0.001). However, with the possible exception of the application decision, 
the size of these effects is not large. We used a random effects specification to 
estimate the between-school variance component (which would be overstated by 
fixed effects due to sampling variation). We find a one s.d. difference in feeder 
school effects to be associated with a 9 percentage point difference in the propensity 
to apply to the specialized high schools, implying similar students attending different 
schools have meaningful differences in application rates. School effects on admission 
are smaller, however. Here a one s.d. difference in feeder school effects is 
associated with a 2.1 point difference in admission rates. This is a large difference, 
but driven by earlier years of admissions; the estimate for more recent years is close 
to zero. We find the s.d. of feeder school effects on admission to the “big 3” 
schools, and on offer acceptance, to be near zero. 
In sum, if there are middle school effects on specialized school admissions, they 
appear to operate on the application margin rather than SHSAT performance. After 
conditioning on State test scores and other student characteristics, there is little 
additional systematic variation in admission rates across middle schools. Of course, 
if middle schools affect specialized high school admissions through achievement 
itself, these findings will understate the importance of middle schools in the 
pipeline.  
7. Simulating the Effects of Alternative Admissions Criteria 
Our descriptive look at the admissions process suggests that not all of the 
demographic imbalance in NYC specialized high schools is attributable to the 
SHSAT. Some groups, including girls, Latinos, and low-income students, are less 
likely to sit for the SHSAT than their prior academic achievement would predict, 
and in the case of girls, are less likely to accept a specialized school offer when given 
one. Asian students, on the other hand, are much more likely to apply and to accept 
an offered seat. These differences are of second order importance for diversity, 
however, next to the SHSAT itself, where the biggest effect on demographics is 
observed.  
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Critics of the SHSAT as the sole factor in admission have argued that more holistic 
criteria—like those used in some other highly selective U.S. high schools—would 
increase access to and diversity in the City’s specialized high schools (Finn & 
Hockett, 2012; Hewitt et al., 2013). We simulated how the composition of 
students in the specialized high schools would change, if at all, under alternative 
admissions policies using our student-level data on applicants. We necessarily 
restrict the analysis to the 2009 applications cycle, the only year for which we have 
data on course grades (an oft-proposed admissions criteria). 
Among the many admissions rules that one might propose, we considered the seven 
described in Table 5. All use some formulaic combination of State test scores, 
course grades, and attendance to extend admissions offers. Rule 6 goes further and 
forces proportional representation by borough, 21  while rule 7 gives priority to 
students whose average test scores and math and English course grades are among 
the top 10 percent in their middle school. For each simulation we fix the number of 
public school students admitted to its actual value in 2009 (4,324, about 6 percent 
of the baseline, and 18.7 percent of applicants). Only applicants—those who 
expressed an active interest in attending a specialized school—were considered for 
admission, though one could apply the same rules to the baseline population to 
award eligibility. 
Table 6 summarizes the simulations, showing how the composition of students 
admitted to specialized high schools would differ under these alternative rules. For 
comparison, the first column provides descriptive statistics for the students actually 
extended an offer in 2009. (These are comparable to those in Table 3 for all 
cohorts). Under most alternative rules, the average ELA and math scores of 
admitted students would be at least as high as the average of those actually admitted 
in 2009. This is largely by construction, since all of the alternative rules rank 
students at least in part by math and ELA scores. Average course grades and 
attendance rates under the alternative rules are also as high as (or higher than) those 
observed among actual admitted students in 2009. The alternative rules do, 
however, significantly alter the gender and racial/ethnic mix of admitted students. 
When a combination of State test scores, grades, and attendance is used in place of 
the SHSAT, a significantly higher fraction of offers would be extended to girls (an 
increase of 9 to 13 points under rules 1-6). In fact, the gender gap would shift 
dramatically in favor of girls with the use of grades and State tests. At the same 




and the fraction extended to Whites would rise 2 to 4 points. (Asians and Whites 
would remain over-represented among offers, relative to baseline). The fraction of 
offers to Black and Latino students would rise modestly in Rules 1-6 (0-4 and 3-11 
points, respectively), though they would remain significantly under-represented. In 
fact, under Rules 2-5, the percent of offers extended to Black students would 
decline from current levels. 
Perhaps surprisingly, rules 1-6 have little to no effect on the concentration of 
specialized high school offers in a minority of feeder schools (as was seen in Figure 
2). The bottom two rows of Table 6 report the number of middle schools that 
comprise the first 50 and 85 percent of offers, after sorting schools in descending 
order by the number of offers. Of rules 1-6, only rule 1 would reduce the 
concentration of offers (slightly). The others increase the clustering of offers into a 
smaller number of middle schools. Even rule 6, which enforces borough 
proportionality, retains a high level of concentration. Rule 7 (the “top 10 percent” 
rule) has the most dramatic effect on the concentration and demographics of 
specialized high school offers. When giving admissions priority to applicants in the 
top 10 percent of each middle school, the racial/ethnic distribution would be much 
closer to baseline, and a higher fraction of offers would be extended to low-income 
students. This assignment rule comes, however, at the cost of lower average math 
and ELA scores, especially relative to rules 1-6. 
These simulations only approximate the potential effect of alternative rules on the 
composition of specialized high schools, for several reasons. First, they do not 
address the general equilibrium implications of a rule change. We took the applicant 
pool and its prior performance (e.g., test scores and grades) as given; it is likely 
both would change under a new policy. A new rule would affect the composition of 
students who apply, and incentives for applicants to shift their emphasis away from 
SHSAT preparation and toward course grades and State tests. Second, our 
simulations omit private school students, who comprise a meaningful share of 
applicants but lack the performance measures used in these rules. (Many public 
school applicants also lack data on these measures, highlighting a potential barrier to 
implementation). Third, (for obvious reasons) our simulations do not consider 
qualitative admissions criteria often proposed, such as recommendations, essays, or 
interviews. Finally, they are uninformative about unmeasured qualities of students, 
such as higher-order thinking skills or the ability to succeed in a competitive 
admissions process, that the SHSAT is intended to measure. To the extent the 
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SHSAT is sensitive to skills that existing performance measures are not, our 
simulations ignore an important dimension of selectivity. More evidence is needed 
on this question. 
8. Discussion 
This paper provides a descriptive look at the pipeline from NYC public middle 
schools to matriculation at the City’s elite specialized high schools. A remarkably 
high percentage of 8th graders aspire to attend one of these schools, and sit for the 
entrance exam, but only a small fraction is admitted. A comparison of mean 
characteristics confirms admitted students are a highly select population on multiple 
dimensions, including State test scores and course grades. They are a somewhat 
more advantaged group than the wider population, although nearly a third are 
eligible for free meals, and almost one in five was born outside of the United States.  
The SHSAT does appear to be a barrier to diversity in the specialized schools. 
Among similar applicants with the same measured performance on State tests of 
math and ELA, girls, Black, Latino, and low-income students are significantly less 
likely to score high enough on the SHSAT to receive an offer of admission. Asian 
and White students are substantially more likely to receive an offer. Simulated 
policies that offer admission on the basis of measures other than the SHSAT, such as 
State test scores, grades, and attendance, suggest many more girls and Latinos (as 
well as Whites) would be admitted under these alternative policies. They would 
not, however, appreciably increase the share of offers given to Black or low-income 
students, nor reduce the high concentration of offers in a small number of middle 
schools.  
Our findings offer several important lessons. First, measures of academic 
performance other than the SHSAT are strong predictors of current admission to 
the specialized high schools. Admissions policies that rely on State test scores and 
course grades would admit many of the same students currently admitted, and 
would continue to yield a class far from demographically representative of NYC’s 
8th graders. Behavioral responses to any new admissions rule would likely limit its 
impact even further. Second, while measures such as test scores, grades, and 
attendance are strongly predictive of current admission, there are large group 
differences that remain unexplained. This suggests the SHSAT plays a powerful role 
above and beyond these other measures. The difference may be higher-order skills 




differences in test preparation. This remains an important open question for future 
research.  
Finally, we identified several potential points of intervention to improve access to 
the specialized high schools for under-represented groups. First, a non-trivial share 
of high-achieving students does not sit for the SHSAT at all. This may reflect a lack 
of interest, a lack of resources for test preparation, or a poor understanding of their 
odds of admission. We found a significant middle school effect on the propensity to 
apply for the specialized schools, suggesting schools may influence this behavior. 
Second, female, Latino, and low-income students are less likely to apply for 
admission than their prior achievement would predict, and girls are much less likely 
to accept an offer when extended one. The latter may again reflect preferences, but 
given the prominent role specialized schools play in STEM education in NYC, a 
better understanding of this phenomenon is needed. Lastly, echoing the Secret 
Apartheid studies of the 1990s, we find that students admitted to the exam schools 
originate from a remarkably small number of the City’s middle schools. This result 
appears more than anything to be a reflection of the highly uneven distribution of 
high-achieving students across schools.  
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   Figure 1: Percent Applying and Receiving Offers to Specialized High Schools by 8th 
Grade Test Scores, and Test Score Distributions of Applicants and Offers, Students 
Entering 9th Grade in 2013  
   A. Percent applying and receiving offers B. Test score distribution of applicants and offers  
                        
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using High School Admissions Process (HSAPS) and other administrative data provided by the NYCDOE. 




Figure 2: Feeder School and Zip Code Representation Among 
Specialized High School Applicants and Admitted Students, 
Students Entering 9th Grade in 2013  
 
                       
Source: Authors’ calculations using High School Admissions Process (HSAPS) and other administrative 
data provided by the NYCDOE.  
Notes: excludes special education,  home school, and alternative feeder schools. Inlcudes a total of 536 
feeder schools and 178 zip codes with at least one student in the baseline sample in 2013. 
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Ranked the School 
for Fall 2014 
Percent of 
Students Who 
Ranked the School 
for Fall 2014 
Number of 
Offers Made 
for Fall 2014 
Stuyvesant High School 1904 3,292 23,408 83.6 952 
Brooklyn Technical High School 1922 5,458 23,371 83.5 1,845 
The Bronx High School of Science 1938 3,037 19,635 70.1 968 
Staten Island Technical High School 1988a 1,235 15,196 54.3 344 












High School for Math, Science, and 











Queens High School for the Sciences 











The Brooklyn Latin School 2006 592 16,675 59.6 484 
      
LaGuardia High School of Music & Art 
and Performing Arts 1936 2,730 14,943 -- 1,970 
Sources: Fall 2014 enrollment is from the 2014-15 Directory of New York City Public High Schools. Counts of students ranking each specialized high school are 
taken from the 2014-15 Specialized High Schools Student Handbook (NYC DOE, 2014) and include 8th and 9th grade test takers. The approximate percentage of 
students ranking the school is based on total number of 28,000 students taking the SHSAT, as reported in NYC DOE (2014).  
Notes: The LaGuardia High School of Music & Art and Performing Arts was formed after the 1961 merger of The High School of Music & Art (founded in 1936) and 





Table 2: Specialized High School Applications and Admissions 
  
A. Baseline sample, applications, offers, and acceptances,  













Baseline sample 728,677 9.5 100.0 - - 
Applied to SPHS 231,974 14.5 31.8 100.0 - 
Offered a SPHS 44,830 16.3 6.2 19.3 100.0 
Offered a “big 3” SPHSa 22,566 15.8 4.6 15.0 77.9 
Accepted SPHS offer 32,262 11.2 4.4 13.9 72.0 
 
B. Offers from specialized high schools, and offer acceptance rates,  




Percent of All 
Offers 
Percent of Offers 
Accepted   
Brooklyn Tech 10,750 37.1 69.6 
  Bronx Science 6,048 20.9 76.1 
  Stuyvesant 5,768 19.9 87.2 
  Brooklyn Latin 1,629 5.6 21.4 
  Staten Island Tech 1,548 5.3 85.6 
  City College 1,174 4.1 59.9 
  Bronx Lehman 1,055 3.6 54.3 
  Queens York 984 3.4 62.0 
  Total 28,956 100 71.4 
  Source: Authors’ calculations using High School Admissions Process (HSAPS) data provided by the NYCDOE.  
Notes: See data appendix for definitions, and Tables A-1 and A-2 for detailed counts by year. a The identity of the offered  
specialized high schools is not reported after 2010, therefore this row and all rows in panel B only include students who entered 
9th grade from the 2005-2006 school year to the 2010-2011 school year.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics–8th Grade Public School Students 












Borough of residence      
   Brooklyn 31.6 35.5 32.3 36.9 34.2 
   Manhattan 11.5 11.5 16.3 15.1 14.7 
   Queens 27.5 30.7 38.9 41.0 38.1 
   Staten Island 6.2 5.9 6.5 2.4 6.8 
   Bronx 23.2 16.4 6.1 4.6 6.2 
Charter middle 1.2 2.1 0.9 0.4 0.8 
      
ELA z-score (8th grade) 0.007 0.662 1.541 1.609 1.517 
Math z-score (8th grade) 0.006 0.742 1.662 1.761 1.693 
Top 2% in ELA (7th grade) 2.8 7.8 25.9 29.2 24.5 
      
Female 49.1 50.8 45.6 45.1 42.3 
Asian 14.2 29.3 54.2 58.2 60.0 
Black 31.9 27.2 7.4 7.0 7.2 
Latino 39.7 24.8 8.7 7.1 8.0 
White 13.4 18.0 29.1 27.5 24.4 
Special education 15.9 4.2 1.2 0.9 1.1 
English language learner 12.0 3.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 
Immigrant 17.6 17.2 16.9 15.9 18.2 
China/Far East Asia origin 2.3 3.7 7.1 7.0 7.9 
Chinese spoken at home 5.3 12.5 28.1 31.8 32.3 
English spoken at home 56.6 54.4 43.7 39.1 38.4 
Free lunch eligible 58.6 47.9 32.6 31.6 35.5 
Reduced price lunch 7.1 9.6 10.5 11.5 11.2 
Universal free meal school 28.6 26.9 21.4 21.9 21.5 
Attendance rate (7th grade) 92.1 95.8 97.5 97.3 97.6 
Age 14.1 13.9 13.8 13.8 13.8 
Absent >30 days 8.6 1.9 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Late >30 days 15.1 6.8 1.6 1.6 1.8 
Number of traditional 
choicesb 
7.1 7.4 6.0 
5.9 
6.0 
      
Travel time to closest “big 3” 41.8 42.7 46.8 46.8 46.8 
Travel time to offered 
SPHS 
- - 52.4 54.8 51.5 
    
 
 N 659,464 198,349 37,532 18,995 28,658
Source: Authors’ calculations using High School Admissions Process (HSAPS) data provided by the NYCDOE. 
See appendix for description of the baseline sample. Includes only students who applied from a NYC public 
school.  
Notes: a The identity of the offered SPHS is not reported in the data after 2010, therefore the “offered a big 3” 
column only includes students who entered 9th grade from the 2005-2006 school year to the 2010-2011 school 
year. b Refers to the number of schools ranked on the student’s main high school admissions form (not the 





Table 4: Average Marginal Effects from Logistic Regression Models for 
Application, Admission, and Offer Acceptance, Students Entering 9th 
Grade from 2005-2013 
 
Applied to SPHS Offered a SPHS 




Travel time to -0.0007 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0002 
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 Recent immigrant 0.0023 
 










 Continued on next page. 
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Table 4 Continued: Average marginal effects from logistic regression 
models for application, admission, and offer acceptance, 2005-2013 
 Applied to SPHS Offered a SPHS 














 Reduced price 
lunch 0.0000 
 










 Universal free meal 



































































































































Source: Authors’ calculations using High School Admissions Process (HSAPS) and other administrative data provided 
by the NYCDOE. 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05. Logit coefficients omitted for 
ease of presentation (reported in Table A-5). The ELA and math z-scores enter the logistic model as a cubic function. 
The AMEs reported above are the average effect of a marginal change in the ELA or math score on the outcome, 






Table 5: Simulated Alternative Admissions Rules 
Rule 1 Applicants are ranked by the average of their 7th grade math and ELA z-
scores, and admitted in order, beginning with the highest average, until 
all seats are filled. (7th grade scores are the most recent available at the 
time of application). 
 
Rule 2 Applicants are ranked by the average of their 7th grade math and ELA z-
scores, and their 7th grade math and English grades (also z-scores), and 
admitted in order, beginning with the highest average, until all seats are 
filled. 
 
Rule 3 The same as Rule 2, except that course grades are weighted, with 
honors/ accelerated classes weighted by a factor of 1.25 prior to 
standardization. Students are admitted in order, beginning with the 
highest average, until all seats are filled. 
 
Rule 4 Applicants are ranked by the average of their 7th grade math and ELA z-
scores, and their 7th grade math, English, social studies, and science 
grades (also z-scores), and admitted in order, beginning with the highest 
average, until all seats are filled. As in Rule 3, honors courses are given 
additional weight. 
 
Rule 5 The same as Rule 3, but the student’s z-score for 7th grade attendance is 
also included in the average. Students are admitted in order, beginning 
with the highest average, until all seats are filled. 
 
Rule 6 The same as Rule 3, but proportional representation by borough is enforced 
(Brooklyn 31.8%, Manhattan 11.3%, Queens 27.6%, Staten Island 
6.1%, and Bronx 23.3%, mirroring the distribution of applicants). 
Within borough students are admitted in order, beginning with the 
highest average, until all seats are filled. 
 
Rule 7 “Top 10%” Rule: all students in the top 10% of their feeder school by 
the measure in Rule 3 are eligible for admission. If the number of 
eligible applicants exceeds the number of available seats, eligible (top 
10%) students are admitted in order, beginning with the highest 
average, until all seats are filled. 
Notes: In the event of ties at the threshold for admission, students at the threshold are offered seats at 
random. (In practice, ties only occur under Rule 1).  
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for Fall 2009 
Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 Rule 4 Rule 5 Rule 6 Rule 7 
ELA z-score (grade 7) 1.413 1.711 1.586 1.493 1.357 1.489 1.466 1.386 
Math z-score (grade 7) 1.696 1.926 1.866 1.742 1.584 1.745 1.672 1.574 
Math grade (0-100) 93.1 93.2 95.1 94.1 93.6 94.2 93.5 93.4 
English grade (0-100) 91.3 92.1 94.1 93.3 93.0 93.4 92.5 92.1 
Attendance rate 97.7 97.5 97.7 97.6 97.5 98.0 97.5 97.2 
Female 46.1 55.4 59.3 57.4 56.9 57.6 58.9 60.2 
Asian 53.6 44.7 47.1 47.1 47.6 49.2 40.9 37.7 
Black 7.6 9.7 7.8 7.1 6.4 7.0 11.1 20.4 
Latino 9.4 13.7 12.5 12.9 13.5 12.4 20.1 21.8 
White 29.2 31.6 32.4 32.7 32.3 31.2 27.5 19.8 
Free lunch eligible 30.6 30.3 30.5 30.6 31.3 31.1 35.2 42.6 
Received an offer in 2009 100.0 62.2 61.3 56.2 51.0 57.1 52.8 42.3 
Received a “big 3” offer in 2009 75.7 49.2 48.4 44.3 39.5 45.1 41.9 32.4 
         Number of schools representing 50% of 
offers 23 27 24 18 16 18 22 57 
Number of schools representing 85% of 
offers 81 94 81 54 43 55 82 117 
 
 Source: Authors’ calculations using High School Admissions Process (HSAPS) and other administrative data provided by the NYCDOE. 
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1 Authors’ calculations using student-level data 
from the NYC Department of Education for 
2013-14.  
2 See also “Charges of Bias in Admission Test 
Policy at Eight Elite Public High Schools,” The 
New York Times, September 29, 2012, p. A28. 
This complaint is currently under review. 
3 As we will show later, this pattern is not due to 
variability in school size. 
4 14,943 students applied for admission to 
LaGuardia for 2014-15, and approximately 970 
were admitted (NYC DOE, 2014). Our 
analysis is restricted to the exam-based schools, 
and thus LaGuardia applications are not 
included in our analysis. However, we briefly 
examine enrollment in LaGuardia as a potential 
outcome for students who do not accept their 
specialized high school offer. 
5 9th graders may also take the SHSAT for 10th 
grade admission. In this paper, we focus only 
on 8th grade applicants.  
6 According to the Specialized High School Student 
Handbook (NYC DOE, 2014) students must 
complete a traditional high school application 
in order to receive their SHSAT or LaGuardia 
audition results. This policy is intended to 
prevent students from betting entirely on 
admission to a specialized school. 
7 The SHSAT is intended to test for high-level 
ability and logical reasoning skills, and consists 
of 95 multiple-choice questions—45 for verbal 
ability and 50 for mathematics. 
8 This fact was captured in a prominent 2012 
article in the New York Times that profiled the 
experience of an African-American girl 
enrolled at Stuyvesant High School, “To Be 
Black at Stuyvesant High,” The New York Times, 
February 25, 2012, p. MB1. Diversity at the 
specialized high schools has declined markedly 
over the past 20 years as the schools have 
become more competitive (Hewitt et al., 
2013). 
9 Related studies include: Clark (2010), who 
finds no effects of attending a selective high 
school in the U.K. on test scores, but positive 
effects on course-taking and university 
enrollment; Berkowitz & Hoekstra (2011), 
who find a positive effect of attending a single 
elite private high school on the selectivity of 
college attended, and Jackson (2010), who 
finds large effects of attending a selective high 
school in Trinidad and Tobago on exam 
performance. Lucas & Mbiti (2014) find no 
impact of admission to highly selective 
secondary schools in Kenya. 
10 For example, by public transportation it would 
take nearly two hours one way to travel from 
Staten Island to Bronx Science, and 1.5 hours 
to travel from Riverdale in the Bronx to 
Brooklyn Tech. 
11 Strictly speaking, to receive an offer of 
admission a student must score sufficiently high 
on the SHSAT to qualify for one of the schools 
on their ranked list. It is possible for a student 
to score high enough to qualify for one of the 
specialized high schools, but not high enough to 
qualify for one on their list. A student in this 
case would not receive an offer.  
12 The district offers a free Specialized High 
School Institute (SHSI) to low-income 6th 
graders with sufficiently high attendance and 5th 
grade test scores. This 22-month program 
involves more than 100 meetings during the 
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summer and on Saturdays at 18 locations 
throughout the City. Though there has not yet 
been a formal evaluation of the SHSI, those 
who choose to take advantage of its intense 
preparation plausibly increase their chances of 
admission. 
13 After 2010 we only know the identity of the 
offered school if the student ultimately enrolled 
in it.  
14 The proportion of private school students as a 
share of the baseline sample has been falling 
(from 10.7 percent in 2005 to 7.9 percent in 
2013) and of specialized high school admissions 
offers (from 17.1 percent in 2005 to 13.2 
percent). 
15 Detailed statistics on country of origin and 
language spoken at home are provided in Table 
A-3. 
16 In a version of model (3) that includes travel 
time to the offered school as a predictor, we 
find a one standard deviation increase in travel 
time for students receiving an offer (19.7 
minutes) is associated with a 2.4 percentage 
point reduction in the likelihood of accepting 
the offer (p<0.001). Because the identity of the 
offered school is known only for 2005-2010, 
we exclude the travel time predictor from the 
model in Table 4. 
17 In a version of model (3) that includes offers 
from LaGuardia High School as a predictor of 
offer acceptance, we find that an offer from 
LaGuardia has a substantial (23.1 percentage 
point) negative effect on the likelihood a 
student accepts their specialized high school 
offer (p<0.001). 
18 In other words, if specialized high school 
applicants and admitted students were 
distributed across middle schools in the same 
way as the baseline population, their curves 
would look the same as the baseline. In 
addition to enrollment differences across 
feeder schools, differences in the propensity to 
move to the private sector for high school will 
affect the shape of the baseline Lorenz curve. 
(Students who intend to move to private 
schools and do not begin the public high school 
admission process are not included in our 
baseline sample). 
19 In 2013, 45 percent of all specialized high 
school offers to public school students went to 
students in only 20 middle schools (out of a 
total of 536 feeder schools in the baseline 
sample).  
20 Coefficients from the LPM versions of our 
Table 4 models are provided in Table A-6. 
21 This is similar to a proposal made to the City 
Council in 2014. See “Crowd Defends Elite HS 
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Data Appendix 
Baseline sample      
Includes any student who: 
(1) Applied to a NYC public high school from a public or private middle school; 
(2) Completed the choice process with a high school program assignment; or 
(3) Completed at least the main round of high school choice (R1 or R2, depending 
on the year); or 
(4) Is flagged as having applied to a specialized high school. 
This is a broadly-defined population that includes students who completed the high 
school choice process, whether or not they started the process late (criteria 1); 
students who opted out of the process midway through, but only after receiving a 
main round match (criteria 2); and students who applied to a specialized high 
school, whether or not they completed the process (criteria 3). This broad 
definition represents the population of students that could have applied to a 
specialized high school (or did), and/or participated in the public school choice 
process at all. 
Those meeting criteria (1) and (3) are straightforward to identify in the data. To 
determine whether students met criteria (2) we used the following information: 
(1) For students entering 9th grade from 2005-2009: the student is coded as having 
a match in R1 (the specialized round) or R2 (the main round); 
(2) For students entering 9th grade in 2010 or 2011: has any program code assigned 
as a R1 or R2 match. The use of the program code is necessary as the match 
variables are incorrect or missing; 
(3) For students entering 9th grade in 2012: has any program code assigned as a R1 
match. In 2012, the specialized round was discontinued and R1 was the main 
round; 
(4) For students entering 9th grade in 2013: the student is coded as having a match 
in R1 or has any program code assigned as a R1 match. 
Applied to SPHS          
Includes any student flagged as having applied. This variable appears to be 
consistently defined over time. We identified roughly 110-165 cases per year for 
the school years beginning between 2005-2008 in which a student received a SPHS 
offer, but was not flagged as an applicant. We imputed a “Y” in these cases. 
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Offered a SPHS        
Includes any student flagged as having received a specialized high school offer. This 
variable appears to be consistently defined over time.  
Offers to “big 3” schools are identified as any students flagged as having received an 
offer and it is known they were offered a “big 3” SPHS (Stuyvesant, Bronx Science, 
or Brooklyn Tech). The identity of the offered school is only reported from 2005-
2010. 
In the schools years beginning in 2011-2013, it is known if a student was finalized to 
a “big 3” SPHS—indicating that they accepted an offer—but we do not observe the 
identity of school offers that were not accepted. Between 2005 and 2008, roughly 
73 percent of students offered a “big 3” SPHS were finalized there (accepted). 
Therefore, using the number finalized underestimates the number of offers by about 
27%.  
The high school program codes for the “big 3” SPHS are: M89S (Stuyvesant), K89S 
(Brooklyn Tech), and X89S (Bronx Science). 
Accepted a SPHS  
To determine whether students accepted a SPHS offer, we used the following 
information: 
(1) For students beginning 9th grade in 2005-2009: students were flagged as 
accepting their SPHS offer; 
(2) For students beginning 9th grade in 2010-2013: students’ final matched 
program was one of the eight specialized high schools (or one of the “big 3”, 
when counting only acceptances to a “big 3” SPHS). 
For students beginning 9th grade from 2005 to 2009, nearly 100% of all students 
flagged as accepting their SPHS offer were finalized to one of the eight specialized 
high schools. Therefore using the number finalized (as in 2010-2013) should be a 
close approximation to the actual number of acceptances. 
The high school program codes for the other five SPHS are K00S (Brooklyn Latin), 
M00S (HS for Math, Science, and Engineering at City College), Q00S (Queens HS 
for the Sciences at York College), R89S (Staten Island Tech), and X00S (HS for 
American Studies at Lehman College).  
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Matriculated to an offered SPHS       
To determine whether a student matriculated to (enrolled in) their offered SPHS, 
we used the following information: 
(1) For students beginning 9th grade in 2005-2010 (when the identity of the offered 
SPHS is known): students were enrolled in October of 9th grade in their offered 
SPHS; 
(2) For students beginning 9th grade in 2011-2012 (when the identity of the offered 
SPHS is not known): students were offered a SPHS, and were enrolled in a 
SPHS in October of 9th grade. 
As of this version of the paper, data on the 9th grade enrollment for the 2013 cohort 
was not yet available. 
Private school student share      
In Table 2 we calculate the percent of each group that are private school applicants. 
The private school applicant variable seems consistently defined in the data, with the 
overall number of private applicants declining over time, but with no major 
fluctuations. In 2005 and 2006 private school applicants were not successfully 
matched to their 9th grade public school enrollment status. Therefore, to calculate 
the percent private among matriculants, we used only data from 2007-2012. 
Course grades     
Data on student grades were available for students in the 2009 cohort only. Among 
public school students in the baseline sample, 80.7% had non-missing grades in all 
four subjects (math, English, social studies and science), and 87.5% had non-missing 
grades in at least three subjects. 85% were not missing math or English. Among 
specialized high school applicants—those used in our simulations in section 7—
86.6% had non-missing grades in all four subjects; 92.1% had non-missing grades in 
at least three subjects; and 91.3% had non-missing grades for math and English. 
We calculated z-scores for each subject grade using the full population of public 
school students observed in 2009. The first set of z-scores uses unweighted grades, 
which range from 0-100. A second set of z-scores uses weighted grades, in which 
the original mark (0-100) is increased by a factor of 1.25 if the class is designated as 
“honors” or “accelerated.” From each set of z-scores we calculated averages over the 
four subjects; when grades were missing in a particular subject, the average was 




Table A-1: Baseline Sample and Applications to, Offers from, and Acceptances of Offers from Specialized 
High Schools, Students Entering 9th Grade from 2005–2013 
 





Baseline sample 84,659 84,612 83,145 81,149 80,918 78,939 78,166 78,531 78,558 728,677 9.5 
Applied to SPHS 21,391 24,722 24,561 25,968 26,770 26,839 27,771 27,339 26,613 231,974 14.5 
   % of baseline 25.3 29.2 29.5 32.0 33.1 34.0 35.5 34.8 33.9 31.8 - 
        
   
 Offered a SPHS 4,086 4,697 4,768 5,158 5,004 5,243 5,354 5,310 5,210 44,830 16.3
   % of applied 19.1 19.0 19.4 19.9 18.7 19.5 19.3 19.4 19.6 19.3 - 
   % of baseline 4.8 5.6 5.7 6.4 6.2 6.6 6.8 6.8 6.6 6.2 - 
        
   
 Offered a “big 3” 3,554 3,758 3,807 3,898 3,695 3,854 - - - 22,566 15.8
   % of applied 16.6 15.2 15.5 15.0 13.8 14.4 - - - 15.0 - 
   % of baseline 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.6 4.9 - - - 4.6 - 
        
   
 Accepted SPHS offer 2,914 3,382 3,328 3,602 3,648 3,800 3,858 3,872 3,858 32,262 11.2
   % of offered 71.3 72.0 69.8 69.8 72.9 72.5 72.1 72.9 74.0 72.0 - 
   % of applied 13.6 13.7 13.5 13.9 13.6 14.2 13.9 14.2 14.5 13.9 - 
   % of baseline 3.4 4.0 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.4 - 
Source: Authors’ calculations using High School Admissions Process (HSAPS) data provided by the NYC Department of Education.  
Notes: Not all students in the HSAPS data fully participated in (or completed) the choice process. Our baseline sample includes students who (1) completed the choice 
process, as indicated by having a final high school assignment, or (2) did not complete the choice process but were given a high school match in the main round of choice 
(indicating that they were active in the system long enough to receive a match in the first round, but may have then decided to opt out early), or (3) did not complete the 
choice process or receive a main round match, but did apply to a specialized high school. The identity of the offered SPHS is not reported in the data after 2010, therefore 
“offered a big 3” counts use only 2005-2010 data. 
 
A-6                                  PATHWAYS TO AN ELITE EDUCATION: WORKING PAPER 
  
  
Table A-2: Offers from specialized high schools and offer acceptance rates, Students Entering 9th 
Grade from 2005–2010  
 
Brooklyn Bronx Stuy- Brooklyn S.I. City Bronx Queens- All 
 
Tech Science vesant Latin Tech College Lehman York SPHS 
2005 1,712 883 959 - - 215 165 152 4,086 
2006 1,777 997 984 - 356 229 190 164 4,697 
2007 1,754 1,083 970 170 254 208 177 152 4,768 
2008 1,833 1,072 993 427 276 177 180 200 5,158 
2009 1,818 970 907 495 318 167 165 164 5,004 
2010 1,856 1,043 955 537 344 178 178 152 5,243 
 
       
  2005–2010 10,750 6,048 5,768 1,629 1,548 1,174 1,055 984 28,956
Percent of all 
offers          
   (2005–2010) 37.1 20.9 19.9 5.6 5.3 4.1 3.6 3.4 100.0 
 
       
  Percent of offers 
accepted 69.6 76.1 87.2 21.4 85.6 59.9 54.3 62.0 71.4 
Source: Authors’ calculations using High School Admissions Process (HSAPS) data provided by the NYC Department of Education.  
Notes: The identity of the offered SPHS is not reported in the data after 2010. Total offer count shown above (28,956) equals the sum of offers from 2005 





Table A-3: Language Spoken at Home and Country of Origin, Public School 
Students Applying to NYC High Schools, Students Entering 9th Grade from 2005-
2013 
 
Baseline Applied to Offered a Offered a Accepted 
 
Sample SPHS SPHS “Big 3”a SPHS offer 
Language spoken at home (%) 
   
 
 English 56.6 54.4 43.7 39.1 38.4 
Spanish 26.7 14.9 4.4 3.8 4.2 
Chinese 5.3 12.5 28.1 31.8 32.3 
Russian 1.6 2.9 4.9 5.6 5.1 
Bengali 1.5 3.7 5.9 5.9 6.9 
Korean 0.8 1.9 4.1 4.8 4.2 
Other 7.5 9.7 8.9 9.0 8.9 
    
 
 Country of origin (%) 
   
 
 Caribbean 5.9 3.2 0.7 0.6 0.7
Central / South America 4.3 2.8 1.1 0.8 1.0 
China / Far East Asia 2.3 3.7 7.1 7.0 7.9 
South Asia 1.8 3.1 3.3 2.9 3.7 
Eastern Europe/former USSR 1.1 1.7 2.3 2.4 2.4 
Other non-U.S. 2.3 2.7 2.6 2.2 2.6 
    
 
 U.S. 82.3 82.8 82.9 84.1 81.7
Source: Authors’ calculations using High School Admissions Process (HSAPS) and other administrative data provided by the NYCDOE.  
Notes: See data appendix for description of the baseline sample. This table includes the subset of students who applied from a NYC 
public school. a The identity of the offered SPHS is not reported in the data after 2010, therefore the “offered a big 3” column uses only 
2005-2010 data. 
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  Table A-4: Most Common Destinations for Public School Students Declining Specialized High 
School Offers, Students Entering 9th Grade from 2005-2013 
High School Borough Programs Count Percent 
Townsend Harris Queens Q37J 1,353 15.2 
LaGuardia Manhattan M80J, M80L, M80M, M80N 1,080 12.2 
Beacon High School Manhattan M71A 515 5.8 
Bard High School Early College Manhattan M51A 495 5.6 
Midwood High School Brooklyn K26K, K26J 364 4.1 
Benjamin H. Cardozo High School Queens Q16J, Q16Z 326 3.7 
Eleanor Roosevelt High School Manhattan M21A 236 2.7 
Leon M. Goldstein High School for the 
Sciences Brooklyn K76A 230 2.6 
Bard High School Early College Queens Queens Q74B 220 2.5 
NYC Lab School for Collaborative Studies Manhattan M74A 181 2.0 
New Explorations into Science, Technology 
and Math High School Manhattan M29A 163 1.8 
Millennium High School Manhattan M25A 135 1.5 
Edward R. Murrow High School Brooklyn K57A 107 1.2 
Bayside High School SMART program 
(discontinued) Queens Q12Q 107 1.2 
Baruch College Campus High School Manhattan M87A 89 1.0 
Francis Lewis High School Queens Q20K 88 1.0 






Source: Authors’ calculations using High School Admissions Process (HSAPS) and other administrative data provided by the NYCDOE. 
Notes: Based on a total of 8,874 public school students who declined a specialized high school offer between 2005 and 2013. “No Assignment” means 
the student was not assigned to any public high school program in NYC at the end of the choice process. They may have enrolled in a private school or 






Table A-5: Logistic Regression Models for Application, Admission, and 











Travel time to closest “big 3” -0.005*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Manhattan -0.104*** 0.634*** 0.183*** -0.340*** 
 
(0.012) (0.027) (0.034) (0.040) 
Queens -0.453*** -0.360*** -0.620*** -0.680*** 
 
(0.011) (0.025) (0.032) (0.041) 
Staten Island -0.479*** -0.570*** -2.374*** 0.181** 
 
(0.017) (0.037) (0.062) (0.063) 
Bronx -0.039*** -0.172*** -0.764*** -0.071 
 
(0.010) (0.032) (0.046) (0.060) 
Charter middle school 0.449*** -0.352*** -0.273* -0.421** 
 
(0.032) (0.090) (0.138) (0.155) 
Female -0.196*** -0.859*** -0.826*** -0.653*** 
 
(0.007) (0.017) (0.022) (0.027) 
Black 0.201*** -0.795*** -0.870*** 0.436*** 
 
(0.012) (0.030) (0.040) (0.053) 
Latino -0.226*** -0.863*** -0.937*** 0.203*** 
 
(0.012) (0.029) (0.040) (0.048) 
Asian 1.076*** 0.545*** 0.650*** 1.150*** 
 
(0.013) (0.022) (0.029) (0.034) 
Other race 0.304*** -0.263* -0.288 -0.053 
 
(0.044) (0.103) (0.179) (0.149) 
Special education -0.382*** 0.249*** -0.047 -0.025 
 
(0.014) (0.071) (0.107) (0.116) 
English language learner -0.600*** -0.738*** -0.852*** -0.376 
 
(0.018) (0.109) (0.165) (0.249) 
Recent immigrant 0.016 -0.087*** -0.063* 0.286*** 
 
(0.010) (0.022) (0.030) (0.038) 
Free lunch eligible -0.208*** -0.420*** -0.352*** 0.315*** 
 
(0.008) (0.019) (0.025) (0.033) 
Reduced price lunch eligible 0 -0.249*** -0.182*** 0.210*** 
 
(0.014) (0.028) (0.036) (0.047) 
Absent 20-30 days -0.199*** -0.205*** -0.194* 0.189 
 
(0.015) (0.061) (0.080) (0.117) 
 
Continued on next page. 
 
A-10              PATHWAYS TO AN ELITE EDUCATION: WORKING PAPER 
  
  
Table A-5 Continued: Logistic Regression Models for Application, 
Admission, and Offer Acceptance, Students Entering 9th Grade from 










UFM school -0.090*** -0.426*** -0.360*** 0.135*** 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.027) (0.034) 
Absent 30+ days -0.171*** -0.319** -0.054 0.836** 
 (0.022) (0.120) (0.148) (0.298) 
Late 30+ days -0.129*** -0.109* -0.052 0.686*** 
 
(0.012) (0.055) (0.073) (0.125) 
Attendance rate 0.050*** 0.008** 0.013*** -0.005 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Age -0.249*** -0.171*** -0.163*** -0.205*** 
 
(0.007) (0.023) (0.030) (0.039) 
Top 2% ELA 0.481*** 0.998*** 0.878*** -0.118*** 
 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.028) (0.030) 
ELA z-score 0.706*** 2.380*** 2.116*** -0.005 
 
(0.007) (0.048) (0.070) (0.082) 
ELA z-score^2 -0.052*** -0.552*** -0.483*** -0.01 
 
(0.003) (0.025) (0.039) (0.035) 
ELA z-score^3 -0.010*** 0.040*** 0.033*** 0.002 
 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) 
Math z-score 0.954*** 3.685*** 3.828*** 0.360* 
 
(0.008) (0.103) (0.140) (0.170) 
Math z-score^2 0.027*** -0.878*** -1.098*** 0.003 
 
(0.003) (0.063) (0.082) (0.096) 
Math z-score^3 -0.024*** 0.060*** 0.108*** -0.01 
 
(0.001) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) 
2006.cohort 0.225*** -0.006 -0.136*** -0.013 
 
(0.015) (0.037) (0.038) (0.060) 
2007.cohort 0.186*** 0.035 -0.121** -0.098 
 
(0.015) (0.036) (0.037) (0.059) 
2008.cohort 0.315*** 0.273*** -0.035 -0.104 
 
(0.015) (0.036) (0.038) (0.059) 
2009.cohort 0.480*** 0.285*** -0.034 -0.024 
 
(0.015) (0.036) (0.038) (0.059) 
 




Table A-5 Continued: Logistic Regression Models for Application, 
Admission, and Offer Acceptance, Students Entering 9th Grade from 










2010.cohort 0.496*** 0.528*** 0.139*** -0.108 
 
(0.015) (0.037) (0.039) (0.060) 





















_cons -2.024*** -4.011*** -4.377*** 3.850*** 
 
(0.131) (0.409) (0.534) (0.694) 
N 608124 192264 124231 36901 
Mean of dep. var. 0.316 0.192 0.151 0.765 
Pseudo R2 0.318 0.473 0.447 0.084 
Log-likelihood -258715.943 -49502.4 -29210.8 -18444.9 
 Source: Authors’ calculations using High School Admissions Process (HSAPS) and other administrative data 
 provided by the NYCDOE. 
 Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05 
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Table A-6: Linear Probability Models for Application, Admission, and 










Travel time to closest “big 3” -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Manhattan -0.012*** 0.062*** 0.016*** -0.058*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) 
Queens -0.068*** -0.035*** -0.054*** -0.106*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) 
Staten Island -0.076*** -0.069*** -0.193*** 0.037*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) 
Bronx -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.038*** -0.007 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) 
Charter middle school 0.113*** -0.038*** -0.025*** -0.080** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.029) 
Female -0.024*** -0.069*** -0.061*** -0.108*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) 
Black 0.015*** -0.070*** -0.067*** 0.091*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
Latino -0.042*** -0.079*** -0.069*** 0.044*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
Asian 0.184*** 0.063*** 0.075*** 0.200*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 
Other race 0.038*** -0.038*** -0.041*** -0.015 
 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.029) 
Special education -0.015*** 0.014*** 0.006 -0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.020) 
ELL -0.047*** -0.038*** -0.028*** -0.054 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.039) 
Recent immigrant -0.002 -0.019*** -0.018*** 0.044*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Free lunch eligible -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.026*** 0.048*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Reduced price lunch eligible -0.001 -0.029*** -0.017*** 0.036*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
UFM school -0.014*** -0.041*** -0.032*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
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Absent 30+ days 0 0.013* 0.018** 0.119** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.039) 
Absent 20-30 days -0.038*** -0.003 0 0.037 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.019) 
Late 30+ days -0.023*** 0.010*** 0.009** 0.098*** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.017) 
Attendance rate 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Age -0.022*** -0.003* -0.003 -0.033*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Top 2% ELA 0.074*** 0.191*** 0.163*** -0.021*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
ELA z-score 0.098*** 0.080*** 0.067*** 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) 
ELA z-score^2 0.002*** 0.037*** 0.026*** -0.003 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
ELA z-score^3 -0.002*** -0.007*** -0.006*** 0 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Math z-score 0.144*** 0.061*** 0.030*** 0.081** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.029) 
Math z-score^2 0.019*** 0.053*** 0.048*** -0.009 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) 
Math z-score^3 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
2006.cohort 0.031*** -0.002 -0.013*** -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) 
2007.cohort 0.027*** -0.002 -0.014*** -0.015 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) 
2008.cohort 0.045*** 0.014*** -0.011*** -0.017 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) 
2009.cohort 0.067*** 0.012*** -0.014*** -0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) 
Continued on next page. 
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2010.cohort 0.067*** 0.024*** -0.007* -0.017 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) 





















_cons 0.282*** 0.042 0.033 1.170*** 
 
(0.015) (0.030) (0.034) (0.113) 
N 608124 192264 124231 36901 
Mean of dep. var. 0.316 0.192 0.151 0.765 
Source: Authors’ calculations using High School Admissions Process (HSAPS) and other administrative data 
provided by the NYCDOE. 
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * = p < 0.05. 
 
